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Equal sharing rules in partnerships
Abstract
Partnerships are the prevalent organizational form in many industries. Profits are most frequently shared
equally among the partners. The purpose of our paper is to provide a rationale for equal sharing rules.
We show that with inequity averse partners the equal sharing rule is the unique sharing rule that
maximizes the partners' incentives to exert effort. We further show that inequity aversion can enhance
efficiency in partnerships of given size, but that it can also cause partnerships to be inefficiently small.
1Equal Sharing Rules in Partnerships
by
Bjo¨rn Bartling and Ferdinand A. von Siemens∗
forthcoming in: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
Partnerships are the prevalent organizational form in many industries. Profits are
most frequently shared equally among the partners. The purpose of our paper is
to provide a rationale for equal sharing rules. We show that with inequity averse
partners the equal sharing rule is the unique sharing rule that maximizes the part-
ners’ incentives to exert effort. We further show that inequity aversion can enhance
efficiency in partnerships of given size, but that it can also cause partnerships to be
inefficiently small. (JEL: D20, D86, J54)
1 Introduction
Partnerships are the prevalent organizational form in many industries, such as law,
accounting, investment banking, management consulting, or medicine.1 The defining
features of a partnership are (i) the joint production of output and (ii) the distribution
of profits among the partners. In his seminal contribution, Holmstro¨m [1982] shows
that partnerships suffer from a severe free-rider problem: since each partner bears her
full effort costs but receives only part of the profits, effort incentives are inefficiently low.
The fact that partnerships are often observed, however, suggests that free-riding is not
necessarily a problem. A prominent explanation is proposed by Kandel and Lazear
[1992].2 They demonstrate that “peer pressure” can mitigate the free-riding problem.
The basic insight is that peer pressure complements monetary incentives: if a partner
shirks, she feels guilt or shame, or has to take social reprisals, and this prevents her from
shirking.
In their analysis, Kandel and Lazear assume—as common in the literature—that
profits are shared equally, and given the equal sharing rule they show how peer pressure
can mitigate the free-riding problem.3 Indeed, whereas there are various ways in which
∗We would like to thank Georg Gebhardt, Sven Rady, Klaus M. Schmidt, the editor, and
two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the
German Research Foundation (DFG) through the SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged.
1See Hansmann [1996] for a detailed account of professions where partnerships are widespread.
2Contractual solutions to free-riding are offered by, e.g., Holmstro¨m [1982] who points to the role of
a budget-breaker, and by Miller [1997] who proposes reporting schemes based on mutual monitoring.
3Other papers that take equal sharing rules as given in their analyses of partnerships are, e.g.,
Farrell and Scotchmer [1988] and Levin and Tadelis [2005].
2profits can be divided among partners, equal profit sharing seems to be very common.
For example, Encinosa, Gaynor, and Rebitzer [2007] analyze data on medical
group practices and report that 54.2% of small practices (3-5 physicians) have an equal
sharing rule in place and that 46% of all groups in their sample fall into this (smallest)
category (Table 2, p. 199). Similarly, Farrell and Scotchmer [1988] have data on
law firms. They write: “The first and most straightforward system is that all members
with the same seniority receive the same profit share. Since junior partners eventually
become senior partners, such a system would be equal division if the firm’s profitability
were constant over time. Such a sharing scheme [...] is probably used by most two or
three-person law firms, which account for about 2/3 of all firms”(p. 293).
The purpose of our paper is to show that with inequity averse partners—a behavioral
assumption that nests guild or shame—the equal sharing rule is the optimal solution to
the incentive problem in a partnership. It is important to notice that our result on
the optimality of the equal sharing rule is not driven by some forthright preference for
sharing rules that induce egalitarian outcomes. Rather, the equal sharing rule is shown
to maximize incentives to exert effort. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
paper to offer a theoretical explanation for the widespread use of equal sharing rules in
partnerships.4
In our model, we analyze partnerships in which each partner decides whether or not
to contribute effort to some joint production. Effort is observable but not verifiable.
Contracts can condition on output, but they cannot assign monetary payments depend-
ing on individual partners’ effort choices. Consequently, the classic free-riding problem
may arise. Partners can renegotiate the contract after they have made their effort de-
cisions. Importantly, we assume that partners are inequity averse: they suffer a utility
loss whenever other partners receive different rents, defined as monetary payoff minus
effort costs.5
There are the following results. We first show how inequity aversion affects renego-
tiations. If partners suffer strongly from advantageous inequity, renegotiations always
result in an equal division of rents independently of the original contract. Since each
partner is compensated for her effort costs and receives an equal share in the joint sur-
plus, all partners make efficient effort choices. In case partners do not suffer strongly
from favorable inequity, contracts are not renegotiated if they are budget-balancing.
Contracts thus determine incentives. We can then derive our main result: if partners
are inequity averse, the equal sharing rule is the unique sharing rule that maximizes the
partners’ incentives to exert effort. This result is based on the following intuition. If
partners are purely self-interested, also unequal sharing rules can maximize incentives.
Optimality then only requires that marginal monetary payoff differences and thus mone-
tary incentives are equalized across partners, but not that payoff levels are equal.6 With
inequity averse partners, equal marginal monetary payoff differences at different mone-
4See also Bose, Pal, and Sappington [2009] who show that it can be optimal for a principal to
commit to equal pay policies in teams to foreclose sabotage.
5There exists ample experimental evidence on the existence and prevalence of such social preferences.
See, e.g., Camerer [2003] and Fehr and Schmidt [2006] for a survey of the literature.
6Marginal incentives are the payoff differences between working and shirking at a given effort vector.
3tary payoff levels do not induce equal marginal incentives: if a partner shirks, she saves
on effort costs and this could improve her relative standing. If the sharing rule is not
equal, this improvement differs among partners, hence partners’ incentives differ. We
show that by equalizing the sharing rule, some partners’ incentives to exert effort can
be improved without harming the incentives of the other partners, while maintaining
budget balance.
Furthermore, given the equal sharing rule as optimal contractual solution, we can de-
rive the condition on the degree of inequity aversion and the production technology under
which it is a Nash-equilibrium that all partners exert effort. The condition shows that
inequity aversion (specifically, suffering from being better off) helps maintaining efficient
effort choices. This result replicates Kandel and Lazear’s finding that peer pressure can
mitigate the free-riding problem, employing inequity aversion as a special form of their
peer pressure function. Moreover, if the production technology has non-increasing re-
turns to scale, our results imply that cooperation in partnerships becomes more difficult
to sustain as the group size increases. This accords to the observation that the fraction
of partnerships with equal sharing rules decreases with team size. For example, in their
data on medical group practices, Encinosa et al. [2007] report that the fraction of
practices with equal sharing rule falls from 54.2% in practices with 3-5 physicians, to
42% in practices with 6-7 physicians, to roughly 20-30% on average for larger practices
(Table 2, p. 199). We finally show that inequity aversion can cause partnerships to be
inefficiently small if the size of the partnership is endogenously determined.
The present paper is closely related to a growing literature that studies the impact
of social preferences in moral hazard problems with multiple agents.7 These articles find
that inequity aversion can improve incentives since agents work harder to avoid suffering
from unfavorable inequality. For example, Itoh [2004], Demougin and Fluet [2006],
and Rey Biel [2008] show that optimal contracts might actually increase inequality to
capitalize on this positive incentive effect.8 Our paper complements these findings as it
demonstrates that effort incentives in partnerships are maximized by sharing rules that
minimize inequality.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 describes
the influence of inequity aversion on renegotiation and derives the optimality of equal
sharing rules. Section 4 discusses implications of our results for the efficiency of effort
provision and the size of partnerships. Section 5 provides a discussion of our assumptions.
Section 6 concludes. All formal proofs are in the Appendix.
7For papers that analyze comparisons between principal and agent, see Itoh [2004], Englmaier
and Wambach [2008], and Dur and Glaser [2008].
8Other papers that analyze social comparisons among agents are, e.g., Bartling [2008], Bartling
and von Siemens [2009], Demougin, Fluet, and Helm [2006], Goel and Thakor [2006], Grund
and Sliwka [2005], Kragl [2008a], Kragl [2008b], Kragl and Schmid [2009], Li [2009], and
Neilson and Stowe [2008].
42 The Model
2.1 Joint Production, Effort, and Information
Consider a partnership (or team) of N identical agents (partners) who can produce joint
output x. Let N = {1, 2, .., N} denote the set of agents in a partnership of size N .
Each agent i chooses an effort contribution ei ∈ {0, 1} to joint production. Individual
effort choices are not verifiable. Effort ei causes costs c(ei), where c(1) = c > 0 and
c(0) = 0. Thus, an agent “works” if she chooses high effort and “shirks” if she chooses
low effort. Let e = 〈ei, e−i〉 be an effort vector consisting of agent i’s effort ei and the
vector e−i of all other agents’ effort choices. Joint output is a deterministic function
x of the number of agents working. It does not depend on the identity of the agents
that either work or shirk. Thus, output reveals the number of agents that work but
not whether a particular agent worked or shirked.9 Let x(K) denote joint output if K
agents work. Define ∆x(K) = x(K)−x(K−1) as the marginal contribution of the K-th
working agent. Output is observable and verifiable, and it is sold at a price normalized
to unity. Thus, the revenue is x(K) when K agents work.
2.2 Contracts
Though we will allow for renegotiation, the relationship between agents is initially gov-
erned by a formal contract. A contract S is a vector valued function that specifies how
the revenue generated by the agents is distributed among them. In a partnership, agents
work closely together and thus know who puts in effort and who does not. Hence, we as-
sume that agents can observe the other agents’ effort decisions but that this information
is not verifiable to a court. A contract can thus condition the distribution of the revenue
only on joint output (but not on individual agents’ effort choices). For each number K,
the number of agents that work, a contract S specifies a vector S(K) that consists of the
individual monetary payoffs si(K) for each agent i ∈ N . Define y(K) =
∑
si(K) as the
sum of monetary payoffs that is allocated to the agents, and ∆y(K) = y(K)− y(K − 1)
as the change in this aggregate payment if K agents rather than K − 1 agents work.
Money can be “burned” but a contract cannot distribute more than the entire output.
The following definitions are used frequently. A contract is called budget-balancing
at K if y(K) = x(K). It is “budget-balancing” if it is budget-balancing at all K ∈
{0, 1, ..., N}. Further, a contract is equal at K if si(K) = sj(K) for all i, j ∈ N so that
all agents get the same monetary payoff in case K agents work. It is “equal at the top”
if it is equal at K ∈ {N − 1, N} and thus all agents get the same monetary payoff in
case all agents or all but one agent work.
2.3 Inequity Aversion and Agents’ Utility Functions
There exists ample empirical evidence that individuals contribute costly effort to joint
production in partnerships although this is inconsistent with the neo-classical model of
9For this reason we do not allow agents to differ in their productivity. Otherwise, aggregate outcome
might reveal who shirked in case not all agents exert effort. The free-riding problem can then be solved.
5rational behavior. Contributions might be driven by social sanctions of other members
of the partnership, by internalized social norms, or by guilt feelings when letting the
others down. To formalize such cooperative behavior we employ the model of inequity
aversion by Fehr and Schmidt [1999].10 We first have to make an assumption about
what exactly agents compare. Within a partnership of N agents, consider an effort
vector e with K agents working with corresponding vector S(K) of monetary payoffs.
We define agent i’s rent as her monetary payoff net of effort cost
(1) ui(e, S(K)) = si(K)− c(ei).
In accordance with classic equity theory we assume that agents incorporate effort costs
in their interpersonal comparisons, i.e. that they compare rents.11 We can now define
an agent’s utility function as follows.
Assumption 1 (Inequity Aversion) Within a partnership of N agents consider an
effort vector e with K agents working with corresponding vector S(K) of monetary pay-
offs. Then
(2) vi(e, S(K)) = ui(e, S(K))
− α 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
max
[
uj(e, S(K))− ui(e, S(K)), 0
]
− β 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
max
[
ui(e, S(K))− uj(e, S(K)), 0
]
describes agent i’s utility.
The parameters α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0 measure the importance of inequity concerns for
the agents. As Fehr and Schmidt [1999] we assume that an agent suffers a utility
loss if she receives a rent different than other agents, but suffers more from inequity
if it is not in her favor, α ≥ β. It is further assumed that β < 1, which implies that
advantaged agents would not “burn” own money to reduce inequity. We normalize the
agents’ utility to zero if they decide not to work in a partnership. In the following
we call agents’ suffering from disadvantageous inequity “envy” and their suffering from
advantageous inequity “compassion.”
2.4 Sequence of Actions, Renegotiation, and Equilibrium
We want to characterize contracts that induce all agents in a partnership of given size
to exert effort. In partnerships, renegotiations are likely because there is no outside
ownership. Renegotiation should be expected to influence ex-post payoffs, which in
10Bolton and Ockenfels [2000] propose a similar model.
11According to equity theory individuals want an equitable relationship between inputs (in our model
effort) and outputs (in our model monetary payoffs). This implies that agents account for effort costs
in their social comparisons. See, e.g., Festinger [1957] and Adams [1963].
6turn determine ex-ante effort incentives. For example, agents could initially agree on a
contract that divides output evenly if all agents work but “burns” the entire output if
at least one agent shirks. Since every agent’s effort decision is pivotal, all agents have
incentives to work. However, Holmstro¨m [1982] shows that such a contract is not
renegotiation-proof. Once an agent has shirked all agents can agree to equally divide
what ought to be burnt. Since all agents profit from redistribution, renegotiation renders
the initial contract non-credible.
We capture renegotiation in the following way. Consider a partnership of size N with
initial contract S. There is the following sequence of actions. First, agents simultane-
ously make their effort choice. Second, output is observed. If, for example, K agents
work, the initial contract S endows agents with legal claims on monetary payoffs as
summarized by the monetary payoff vector S(K). The contract thereby sets the stage
for renegotiations. Third, agents might renegotiate the monetary payoff vector S(K).
Finally, payoffs are realized.
Instead of modeling the renegotiation process explicitly we make the following as-
sumptions. Agents anticipate that certain monetary payoff vectors and thus certain
contracts are renegotiation-proof in the following sense. A monetary payoff vector S(K)
is “renegotiation-proof” if and only if there exists no S ′(K) that strictly increases the
utility of at least one agent without reducing the utility of at least one other agent.
A contract S is “renegotiation-proof” if and only if for all K ∈ {0, 1, ..., N} the mon-
etary payoff vector S(K) is renegotiation-proof for all effort vectors e with K agents
working. Note that this definition distinguishes between renegotiation-proof monetary
payoff vectors S(K) and renegotiation-proof contracts S. To preclude renegotiation as
far as possible we restrict attention to contracts that are renegotiation-proof whenever
possible. Yet in the following section we show that if agents are very compassionate (to
be made precise below), no contract is renegotiation proof. To pin down the result of
renegotiation in this case, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2 (Renegotiation) Consider an effort vector e with K agents working.
If the monetary payoff vector S(K) is not renegotiation-proof, renegotiation results in a
Pareto-efficient renegotiation-proof payoff vector S ′(K).
We can now define what constitutes equilibrium effort choices. In our reduced form
game (renegotiation is not modeled explicitly) an agent’s pure strategy is simply an
effort choice. A Nash-equilibrium consists of effort choices for all agents i ∈ N that are
mutually optimal given the initial contract S and the anticipated renegotiations. We
concentrate on the conditions under which there exists a Nash-equilibrium in which all
agents exert effort. We look for the contract that maximizes the incentive of the agent
who has the weakest incentive to work in case all other agents’ work. We then say that
this contract “maximizes agents’ minimum incentives to exert effort.”
73 Optimality of Equal Sharing Rules
3.1 Inequity Aversion and Renegotiation
Before we proof the optimality of equal sharing rules, we have to analyze the impact of
inequity aversion on renegotiations. This is captured in the following proposition. All
formal proofs can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 1 (Renegotiation) Consider an effort vector e with K agents working.
1. If β ∈ [0, (N −1)/N), then the monetary payoff vector S(K) is renegotiation-proof
if and only if it is budget-balancing.
2. If β ∈ [(N −1)/N, 1), then the monetary payoff vector S(K) is renegotiation-proof
if and only if it is budget-balancing and ui(e, S) = uj(e, S) for all agents i, j ∈ N .
This result is based on the following intuition. Suppose S(K) is not budget-balancing.
Consider the following new allocation: take the part of the output that ought to be
burned and divide it equally among the agents. This increases the monetary payoff
of all agents without changing their relative standing, hence all agents agree. In the
ensuing analysis we restrict attention to contracts that are budget-balancing.
Further, if agents are not very compassionate, β < (N − 1)/N , then every budget-
balancing contract is renegotiation-proof. In this case, agents do not agree to a reduction
in their monetary payoffs even if the redistribution decreases inequity by increasing
the monetary payoffs of the agents that are worse off. Any redistribution of a budget-
balancing monetary payoff vector requires that the monetary payoff of at least one agent
is reduced. This agent vetoes any renegotiations.
However, if agents are very compassionate, β ≥ (N − 1)/N , a budget-balancing
monetary payoff vector S(K) need not be renegotiation-proof. In this case, agents are
so keen on diminishing inequity amongst themselves that they hand over some of their
monetary payoff to agents being worse off. It follows that S(K) is renegotiation-proof
if and only if it is budget-balancing and all agents receive the same rent irrespective of
their effort choice. Thus, a renegotiation-proof contract S must condition the vector of
monetary payoffs not only on the number of agents working but on the entire effort vector
e. This is not feasible as individual effort choices are not contractible. Contrary to an
individual monetary payoff vector S(K), a contract S can thus never be renegotiation-
proof if agents are very compassionate.
To summarize: we want contracts to be renegotiation-proof (as far as possible) and
thus limit attention to budget-balancing contracts. If agents are very compassionate,
no contract is renegotiation proof. We then assume that renegotiation results in a
renegotiation-proof distribution of monetary payoffs and thus in a budget-balancing
monetary payoff vector that equalizes all agents’ rents.
3.2 Optimal Contracts
In this section, we show that the equal sharing rule always maximizes agents’ incentives
to exert effort if and only if agents are inequity averse. We first discuss the case in which
8agents are very compassionate, β ≥ (N−1)/N . Incentives depend on the anticipated ex-
post distribution of monetary payoffs, which is then determined by renegotiation. Since
the anticipated ex-post distribution is independent of the initial contract, any initial
contract—including a budget-balancing contract that is equal at the top—generates the
same incentives to exert effort. Proposition 1 and Assumption 2 thus have the following
implication.
Corollary 1 (Strong Compassion and Irrelevance of Contracts) Suppose
agents are very compassionate, β ∈ [(N − 1)/N, 1). Then the budget-balancing contract
S that is equal at the top maximizes agents’ minimum incentives to exert effort.
In the following, we concentrate on the case in which agents are not very compas-
sionate, β < (N − 1)/N . Budget-balancing contracts are then not renegotiated and
determine incentives. The following proposition describes our main result.
Proposition 2 (Weak Compassion and Equal Sharing Rules) Suppose agents
are not very compassionate, β ∈ [0, (N − 1)/N). Then the budget-balancing contract S
that is equal at the top maximizes agents’ minimum incentives to exert effort, and it
is the unique contract maximizing agents’ minimum incentives if and only if agents are
inequity averse.
Putting Proposition 2 differently: making a budget-balancing contract S also equal
at the top always strictly improves agents’ minimum incentives if agents are inequity
averse. But if agents are purely self-interested, this need not be the case. Note that
Proposition 2 postulates the optimality of equal sharing rules only by referring to agents’
incentives to exert effort and not by referring to a forthright preference for equal sharing
rules. Instead, a contract that is equal at the top maximizes the incentive of the agent
who has the weakest incentive to work and thus agents’ minimum incentives to exert
effort.
The intuition for Proposition 2 might be best understood by first referring to the case
of selfish agents. Selfish agents’ effort choices depend only on the resulting changes in
their effort costs and monetary payoffs. Maximizing minimum incentives only requires
that the change in aggregate monetary payoffs must be divided equally, but the level
of payoffs need not be equal. If agents differ in bargaining power when forming the
partnership, absolute levels of payoffs can well differ across agents. Equalizing these
absolute payoff levels while dividing the change in aggregate monetary payoffs equally
has no incentive effect for selfish agents. Hence, there is no driving force towards the
equal sharing rule.
In contrast, with inequity averse agents equalizing the absolute level of monetary
payoffs strictly improves agents’ minimum incentives. The argument is based on the
observation that agents’ ranking and thus absolute monetary payoff levels influence the
incentive effect of changes in monetary payoffs: inequity averse agents value an increase
in their monetary payoff the most if they are behind and thus suffer from envy. Given
an unequal sharing rule, it is therefore possible to find an agent such that equalizing
9monetary payoffs keeps that agent’s incentives constant while improving the incentives
of the other agents.
The following argument makes the above reasoning more precise. Consider a contract
that is not equal at the top. Then there exists an agent, say agent i, who gets the lowest
monetary payoff if all agents work. Since all agents incur the same effort costs if all
agents work, agent i holds the lowest rank (the lowest relative position). Now suppose
agent i’s monetary payoff is increased in case N − 1 and in case N agents work. These
changes satisfy the following properties. First, what is given to agent i is taken from
the others so that budget-balance is maintained. Second, agent i’s incentives are held
constant. These contract changes render the contract more equal. Moreover, they have
the following incentive effects. Since agents suffer more from envy than from compassion,
the lower the rank of an agent the higher the utility gain from increasing her monetary
payoff. By choice of agent i her rank cannot be lower if she is the only agent shirking
as compared to the situation in which everybody works—in the latter case she already
holds the lowest possible rank. Suppose she improves her rank by shirking. To keep her
incentives unchanged, her monetary payoff must then be increased by a smaller amount
if all agents work than if one agent shirks. This has the following implication for the
incentives of the other agents. Due to budget-balance the monetary payoff of all other
agents decreases more if one agent shirks than if all agents work. If agents are not very
compassionate and hence enjoy having a higher monetary payoff, these agents’ utility is
decreased by more if one of them shirks than if all work. Their incentives to work are
thus strictly improved.
3.3 Numerical Example: Inequity Aversion and Incentives
The following numerical example illustrates the impact of inequity aversion on the incen-
tive effect of different sharing rules. Take a partnership of three agents with production
technology x(2) = 9 and x(3) = 12. Agents’ effort costs are c = 1. First, consider a
budget-balancing contract S that is equal at the top so that
(3) S(3) = (4, 4, 4) and S(2) = (3, 3, 3).
Given this contract all agents get an equal rent of 4 − 1 = 3 if all agents work. If one
agent shirks, she gets a rent of 3 whereas the other agents get rents of 3−1 = 2. We can
now derive agents’ incentives. (i) Suppose agents are selfish. Since they only care for
their own rents, all agents have equal incentives to work of 3−3 = 0. (ii) Suppose agents
are inequity averse. Then agents still get a utility of 3 if all agents work because there
is no rent inequity. But if one agent shirks, she suffers from compassion with respect to
the other agents and gets an utility of only 3− β. All agents then have equal incentives
to work of 3−3 +β = β. Given contract S, relative to pure selfishness, compassion thus
improves agents’ incentives.
Second, consider a budget-balancing contract S ′ that is unequal at the top where
(4) S ′(3) = (4.5, 4.5, 3) and S ′(2) = (3.5, 3.5, 2).
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Given this contract, agent 1 and 2 get rents of 4.5− 1 = 3.5 and agent 3 gets a rent of
3− 1 = 2 if all agents work. If agent 1 (or 2) shirks, she gets a rent of 3.5. Agent 2 (or
1) then gets a rent of 2.5 and agent 3 gets a rent of 1. If agent 3 shirks, she gets a rent
of 2 while agent 1 and 2 both get a rent of 2.5. We can now derive agents’ incentives. (i)
Suppose agents are selfish. Agent 1 and 2 then have incentives to work of 3.5− 3.5 = 0
while agent 3 has incentives to work of 2 − 2 = 0. (ii) Suppose agents are inequity
averse. If all agents work, agent 1 and 2 get an utility of 3.5− 0.75β, while agent 3 gets
an utility of 2− 1.5α. All agents thus suffer from compassion or envy even if all agents
work. If agent 1 (or 2) shirks, she gets an utility of 3.5 − 1.75β, hence her incentive to
work is 3.5− 0.75β − 3.5 + 1.75β = β. If agent 3 shirks, she gets an utility of 2− 0.5α.
She has incentives to work of 2− 1.5α − 2 + 0.5α = −0.5α. Given contract S ′, relative
to pure selfishness, inequity aversion does not improve the incentives of agent 1 and 2,
but it decreases the incentives of agent 3.
Finally, we can compare the incentives that contracts S and S ′ provide. Both divide
the changes in aggregate production equally, and thereby provide selfish agents with
identical incentives to work. However, the equal sharing rule S provides inequity averse
agents with strictly stronger minimum incentives to work than sharing rule S ′ because
it improves the incentives of the critical agent 3.
4 Inequity Aversion, Cooperation, and Partnership Size
4.1 Cooperation in Partnerships of Given Size
In the previous section we have shown that the equal sharing rule is the unique contract
that maximizes inequity averse agents’ minimum incentives to exert effort. Building
on this result, we can now derive the precise conditions under which there exists a
Nash-equilibrium in which all agents work. We demonstrate that compassion facilitates
cooperation. Depending on whether agents are very compassionate or not, there are two
cases.
If agents are very compassionate, β ≥ (N − 1)/N , contracts are irrelevant as renego-
tiation always ensures that all agents get equal rents. Each agent thus knows that she
will be compensated for the incurred effort cost and in addition receive a share 1/N of
the generated surplus. If N agents work, the surplus is the agents’ aggregate monetary
payoff minus the sum of their effort costs, x(N) − N c. Each agent thus has incentives
to exert effort if and only if her effort costs are smaller than the resulting increase in
aggregate payment. As the following corollary shows, ex-post renegotiation solves the
free-riding problem.
Corollary 2 (Strong Compassion and Cooperation) Suppose β ∈ [(N−1)/N, 1)
and consider a partnership of size N . If and only if
(5) ∆x(N) ≥ c,
then there exists a contract under which all agents working forms a Nash-equilibrium.
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Consider now the case where agents are not very compassionate, β < (N − 1)/N .
Budget-balancing contracts are then not renegotiated and determine incentives. Propo-
sition 2 allows us to restrict attention to contracts that are equal at the top. If an agent
shirks whereas all other agents work, her monetary payoff is then reduced by her share
∆x(N)/N in the reduction of the aggregate payment to all agents. She saves c on ef-
fort costs, but she also suffers βc from cheating the other agents. Inequity aversion—in
particular compassion—thus improves incentives. This is summarized in the following
corollary.
Corollary 3 (Weak Compassion and Cooperation) Suppose β ∈ [0, (N−1)/N)
and consider a partnership of size N . If and only if
(6)
∆x(N)
N
≥ (1− β) c,
then there exists a contract under which all agents working forms a Nash-equilibrium.
Inequity aversion thus facilitates cooperation: there exist situations in which coop-
eration is implementable if and only if agents’ social preferences are sufficiently pro-
nounced. The condition for exerting effort depends on the agents’ degree of compassion.
If agents are very compassionate, β ≥ (N − 1)/N , they anticipate renegotiation and
thus have an incentive to maximize joint surplus. If agents are not very compassionate,
β < (N − 1)/N , they know that there will be no renegotiation. They are thus not
interested in maximizing joint surplus. Yet if an inequity averse agent shirks whereas all
other agents work, she incurs a utility loss from being better off than all other agents. If
this “shame for cheating” outweighs the potential increase in her rent, the agent abstains
from shirking.12 On a more technical level, compassion reduces a shirking agent’s utility
precisely in those cases in which she actually shirks. As contracts cannot condition on an
agent’s effort decision, they cannot afflict the above punishment with equal precision.13
Furthermore, the above results imply that if all agents working is not efficient, there
exists no contract that can implement this. Thus, inequity aversion can never generate
cooperation if this is inefficient.
Finally, the analysis shows the impact of partnership size on cooperation: as long as
∆x(N)/N decreases with the size N of the partnership (i.e. marginal returns to effort
are not increasing too much), the minimum level of inequity aversion required to sustain
cooperation increases with partnership size. This offers an explanation for the casual
observation that small partnerships often work well whereas larger ones frequently suffer
from free-riding.
12This result replicates Kandel and Lazear’s finding that peer pressure can mitigate the free-riding
problem, employing inequity aversion as a special form of their peer pressure function.
13Suppose agents enjoy being better off than others, β < 0. Compared to selfish agents, such “pride”
or “status” preferences tighten the condition for cooperation as given in Corollary 3. This observation
stresses the importance of a good “team spirit” to avoid such rivalry among partners.
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4.2 Endogenous Partnership Size
At first sight, Corollaries 2 and 3 give the impression that inequity aversion has an
unambiguously positive impact on cooperation within partnerships. Given the sharing
rule is equal at the top, compassion indeed improves incentives. But our numerical
example shows that envy—the other side of inequity aversion—can be detrimental to
incentives if the sharing rule is not equal at the top.
In this section, we want to demonstrate that this negative effect of inequity aversion
might decrease efficiency in a situation in which incumbent members can decide whether
to expand the partnership by allowing new members to join. At least since Ward [1958]
it is well known that equal sharing rules restrict the maximum size of partnerships, be-
cause incumbent partners are willing to accept a new member only if the latter increases
average productivity. However, this argument takes the equal sharing rule as exoge-
nously given; it does not provide a reason why new members must be given an equal
share of total output. Suppose an expansion of the partnership by a new member is
efficient but decreases average productivity. Given an equal sharing rule, incumbent
members would veto the expansion. But with purely self-interested partners it can be
possible to find an unequal sharing rule that (i) provides the incumbent members and
the new member of the partnership with incentives to exert effort, and (ii) gives the
incumbent members a payoff that is at least as high as before the expansion. Hence,
incumbent members would not veto the expansion. The contribution of our paper is to
show that with inequity averse partners this unequal sharing rule might not provide the
new member with sufficient incentives to exert effort.
Inequity aversion thus imposes a restriction on the inequality of sharing rules if
partners’ minimum incentives to work are not to be harmed. A certain degree of inequity
might be necessary to compensate the incumbent members for the decreasing average
productivity. By restricting the rents that incumbent partners can extract from new
partners, inequity aversion can lead to inefficiently small endogenous partnership sizes.
This is summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 4 (Inefficiently Small Partnership Size) Suppose incumbent part-
ners can decide whether to expand the partnership. If partners are inequity averse, they
might refrain from an efficient expansion of the partnership.
As an illustration, consider again the numerical example at the end of Section 3.
Suppose agent 1 and 2 can form a partnership on their own and, sharing equally, both
get a rent and utility of 3.5. Agent 3’s outside productivity is taken to be very low so
that she always wants to join this partnership. If agents 1, 2, and 3 form a partnership
under the equal sharing rule S as given in (3), then all agents working forms a Nash-
equilibrium and each agent gets a rent and utility of 3. Since this falls short of the utility
of 3.5 that agents 1 and 2 can get on their own, they are not willing to accept agent 3 as
new member in their partnership given the equal sharing rule S. But agent 1 and 2 could
instead offer agent 3 to join their partnership under the unequal contract S ′ as given
in (4). By increasing their share of the aggregate output, they raise their rent to 3.5 if
agent 3 exerts effort. If agents are selfish, all agents working forms a Nash-equilibrium,
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and agent 1 and 2 would not veto the expansion. However, if agent 3 is inequity averse,
it is no longer a Nash-equilibrium that all agents work. Given that agent 3 would shirk,
agent 1 and 2 would again veto the expansion – even though this would be efficient.14
Corollary 4 shows that inequity aversion does not always promote efficiency. If an
efficient expansion of the partnership decreases average productivity, and if partners
are inequity averse, then it can be the case that incumbent partners would have to
forgo some of their payoff to be able to offer a new partner incentive compatible shares
in total output. In these cases the partnership remains inefficiently small. This result
complementsAkerlof [1982] andAkerlof and Yellen [1990]’s finding that fairness-
oriented behavior of workers can lead to involuntary unemployment. In their models,
efficiency wages induce workers to reciprocate and exert higher effort. The flip side of this
is that efficiency wages are above market clearing wages and thus lead to unemployment.
The mechanism at force in our model is very different, but implanted into a market
setting, it could offer an additional reason for why fairness preferences might lead to
involuntary unemployment.
5 Discussion
We made a number of simplifying assumptions to keep the model tractable. In this
section, we provide some discussion on the robustness of our results regarding these
assumptions.
5.1 Continuous Effort Choices
In our model, agents face a binary effort choice. Suppose instead that effort can be
chosen continuously. If agents are very compassionate, contracts are irrelevant as rene-
gotiation ensures that rents are divided equally among the agents. Since all agents have
incentives to maximize joint surplus, effort choices are efficient. If agents are not very
compassionate, budget-balancing contracts are not renegotiated and determine incen-
tives. If the effort cost function is convex, efficiency requires that all agents make the
same effort choices. Restricting attention to continuous contracts, optimal incentives
then once again require that marginal increases in output are divided equally. In con-
trast to the case with selfish agents, inequity averse agents’ incentives can be improved
if, in addition to equal margins, agents receive equal shares of the output. The reason
is that if all agents receive the same rent, an agent who shirks increase his rent but
increases also rent inequality. Since he dislikes rent inequality, his compassion decreases
his temptation to shirk. If in equilibrium agents receive different shares of the total
output, at least one agent is worse off than others. If this agent shirks, he can then both
increase his rent and decrease unfavorable inequality, i.e. envy increases the temptation
14Suppose agents enjoy being better off than others, β < 0. As in Frank [1984]’s seminal contribution
on status preferences and wage compression, incumbent agents might then recruit new members with
a low rent just to “consume” the feeling of being better off. In this case partnership sizes can increase
beyond what would be observed with purely self-interested agents.
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to shirk. We thus conjecture that allowing effort choices to be continuous with convex
effort costs would not affect our main results.
5.2 Stochastic Output
We assume that joint output is deterministic and only determined by agents’ effort
choices. Suppose instead that output is affected by stochastic shocks. If agents are
very compassionate, renegotiation will result in an equal division of ex-post rents for all
possible realizations of joint output. Agents then have incentives to maximize expected
output so that effort choices are ex-ante efficient. If agents are not very compassionate,
budget-balancing contracts determine incentives. Suppose stochastic shocks are small
so that it is still possible to infer the number of agents who worked or shirked from the
output level (if this is not the case the information structure changes fundamentally).
The arguments used in the proof can then be adapted to the case with stochastic output.
Instead of equalizing the sharing rules for the deterministic outcome levels indicating
that all and all but one agent worked, now all the possible outcome levels in these cases
can be equalized in a way that increases incentives. We thus conjecture that allowing
joint output to be stochastic does not affect our main results as long as the information
structure is not fundamentally affected.
5.3 Unobservable Effort Choices
We assume that agents can observe each other’s effort choices. Suppose instead that
an agent’s effort choice is private information. Even if agents are very compassionate,
renegotiation might then no longer result in an equal division of rents. The reason is that
an agent who shirked is willing to transfer some monetary payoff to another agent only if
he believes that this agent is worse off. If he believes that the other agent also shirked, he
does not agree to a reduction in his own share. However, suppose agents simultaneously
announce their effort choices. If an agent expects all other agents to announce their own
effort choice truthfully, he also has an incentive to announce his effort choice truthfully.
In this case, renegotiation leads to an equal division of joint surplus, and the agents
have efficient effort incentives. If agents are not very compassionate, budget-balancing
contracts again determine incentives. For this case we show that a sharing rule that
is equal at the top maximizes agents’ minimum incentives to exert effort given that all
other agents have exerted effort. Since we only consider unilateral deviations, a shirking
agent knows who shirked so that our results continue to hold.
5.4 Heterogeneous Agents
Finally, we assume that the agents are homogeneous. First, suppose instead that agents
differ in their effort costs. If agents are very compassionate, renegotiation will still result
in an equal division of rents so that agents have efficient effort incentives. If agents are
not very compassionate, contracts matter. A contract that divides increases in joint
output equally does not maximize minimum incentives to exert effort. The reason is
that agents with higher effort costs must be given higher monetary incentives. If agents
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are inequity averse, the same argument applies. However, inequity aversion renders it
optimal to set sharing rules so as to equate rents. Otherwise, an agent who shirks can
not only increase his rent but also decrease unfavorable rent inequality. Our results
thus only imply that agents with identical effort costs should receive the same share
of the joint output. Second, suppose agents differ in their degree of inequity aversion.
In this case, our results continue to hold. As long as the least compassionate agent is
sufficiently compassionate, renegotiation will solve the team production problem. If at
least some agents are not very compassionate, contracts determine incentives. Making
contracts equal at the top never reduces agents’ minimum incentives to exert effort
even if agents are selfish. However, if some agents are inequity averse, contracts that
are equal at the top are uniquely optimal. Our results thus continue to hold if agents
have heterogeneous social preferences. Notice that this holds true even if agents’ social
preferences are private information.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes how incentive provision in partnerships is affected if partners are
inequity averse in the sense of Fehr and Schmidt [1999]. Many partnerships share
profits equally among the partners. The contribution of this paper is to provide a
rationale for such equal sharing rules. We show that with inequity averse partners the
equal sharing rule is the unique sharing rule that maximizes the partners’ incentives to
exert effort. In contrast, with purely self-interested partners also unequal sharing rules
can maximize incentives. In our discussion of the model assumptions we argue that this
finding continues to hold even if effort is continuous, if joint output is perturbed by
small shocks, if effort choices are unobservable, and if the partners’ degrees of inequity
aversion differ and are private information. From an efficiency point of view, the equal
sharing rule cannot do harm—but if partners are inequity averse, the equal sharing rule
strictly improves incentives.
Moreover, we show that inequity aversion can provide partners with sufficient in-
centives to work in cases where this is not feasible with purely self-interested partners.
The conditions under which inequity aversion permits cooperation become less restric-
tive with decreasing size of the partnership. This fits the common observation that
small partnerships often work well whereas larger ones frequently suffer from free-riding.
We also discuss the case where incumbent partners can decide whether to expand the
partnership. In this case, inequity aversion can have adverse effects as it can lead to inef-
ficiently small partnerships. This final result complements—within a setting that is not
characterized by gift-exchange—Akerlof [1982] and Akerlof and Yellen [1990]’s
finding that fairness-oriented behavior of workers can lead to involuntary unemployment.
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Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We first show that budget-balance is necessary for a vector S(K) of monetary payoffs
to be renegotiation-proof. Consider a S(K) with y(k) < x(K) for K agents working
yielding output x(K). Then S ′(K) with s′i(K) = si(K) + (x(K) − y(K))/N for all
i ∈ N increases the monetary payoff for all agents by an identical, strictly positive
amount while keeping the inequity between the agents unchanged. Therefore, all agents
are strictly better off under S ′(K), and S(K) is not renegotiation-proof.
We next show that if β < (N − 1)/N , then budget-balance is also sufficient for S(K)
to be renegotiation-proof. Given a budget-balancing S(K) consider any other S ′(K)
with different monetary payoffs. Then there exists an agent i with s′i(K) < si(K). If
β < (N − 1)/N , then an agent’s utility is strictly increasing in her monetary payoff
even if the money taken away from her is given to those agents with lower utility and
thus decreases inequity. Thus, at least agent i does not agree to S ′(K) and S(K) is
renegotiation-proof.
We next demonstrate that if β ≥ (N−1)/N , then given effort vector e with K agents
working, a budget-balancing monetary payoff vector S(K) can be renegotiation-proof
only if ui(e, S(K)) = uj(e, S(K)) for all i, j ∈ N and S(K). Otherwise there exist agents
i, j ∈ N with ui(e, S(K)) > uj(e, S(K)). Define the set of agents with the highest utility
as
(A1) A = {i ∈ N : ui(e, S(K)) ≥ uj(e, S(K))∀ j ∈ N}.
#A is the number of agents in A. Define AC = N \ A. Take a new monetary payoff
vector S ′(K) with s′i(K) = si(K)−  for all i ∈ A and s′j(K) = sj(K) + (#A/#AC) for
all j ∈ AC . Then S ′(K) is budget-balancing. Choose  strictly positive but sufficiently
small so that ui(e, S
′(K)) ≥ uj(e, S ′(K)) for all i ∈ A, j ∈ AC .
We can now check whether S ′(K) is accepted by all agents. Consider first all agents
j ∈ AC . These agents receive higher monetary payoffs. Since for these agents payoffs
increase equally, suffering from inequity with respect to all agents in AC remains un-
changed. But the suffering with respect to all agents i ∈ A is reduced. Thus, all agents
j ∈ AC prefer S ′(K) to S(K). Consider next all agents i ∈ A. These agents’ utility is
changed by
(A2) −+ β
N − 1
∑
j∈AC
(
+ 
#A
#AC
)
= 
(
β
N
N − 1 − 1
)
≥ 0
since β ≥ (N − 1)/N . All agents thus weakly prefer monetary payoff vector S ′(K) to
S(K). Consequently, budget-balance and ui(e, S(K)) = uj(e, S(K)) for all i, j ∈ N are
necessary for a monetary payoff vector to be renegotiation-proof if β ≥ (N − 1)/N .
We finally show that if β ≥ (N − 1)/N , then given an effort vector e with K agents
working, budget-balance and ui(e, S) = uj(e, S) for all i, j ∈ N are sufficient for a
monetary payoff vector to be renegotiation-proof. If this condition is satisfied, any
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changes in monetary payoffs implied by another S ′(K) reduce the monetary payoff of at
least one agent. If agent i’s payoff is reduced the most, then ui(e, S
′(K)) < ui(e, S(K))
and ui(e, S
′(K)) ≤ uj(e, S ′(K)) for all j ∈ N . Agent i’s rent is reduced while in addition
she now suffers from inequity with respect to some other agents. She therefore prefers
S(K) to S ′(K), and the monetary payoff vector S(K) is renegotiation-proof. Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is structured as follows. In part A.2.1 we show that any initial budget-
balancing contract that is not equal at N can be made equal at N while preserving
budget-balance and without harming agents’ incentives. In part A.2.2 we show that any
budget-balancing contract that is already equal at N can be made also equal at N − 1
while preserving budget-balance and strictly improving agents’ minimum incentives to
exert effort. In part A.2.3 we study the conditions under which making a contract equal
at N −1 and N always strictly increases agents’ minimum incentives to exert effort. We
show how this depends on whether agents are inequity averse or selfish. Part A.2.3 is
necessary to complete the proof since making a contract that is unequal at N equal at N
might simultaneously make the contract also equal at N−1. In this case we cannot refer
to part A.2.2 to show that agents’ minimum incentives are strictly improved. Indeed, in
exactly this case making a contract equal at the top improves agents’ minimum incentives
if and only if agents are inequity averse.
A.2.1 Making a Contract Equal at N Does Not Harm Incentives
Consider a budget-balancing contract S with si(N) 6= sj(N) for some i, j ∈ N . Referring
to this contract S we define the following sets of agents:
B = {i ∈ N : si(N) ≤ sj(N) ∀ j ∈ N}(A3)
C = {i ∈ B : si(N − 1) ≤ sj(N − 1)∀ j ∈ N}.(A4)
Set B contains all agents with the lowest monetary payoff if all agents work. It is
non-empty and a strict subset of N . Set C contains those agents from B with the lowest
monetary payoff if one agent shirks. It is non-empty and can be identical to set B.
Finally, let
Hi = {j ∈ N : sj(N − 1)− c > si(N − 1)}(A5)
Li = {j ∈ N , j 6= i : sj(N − 1)− c ≤ si(N − 1)}(A6)
be the sets of agents who—given that agent i shirks and all other agents work—have a
strictly higher or weakly lower monetary payoff net of effort costs than agent i, respec-
tively. Note that Hi ∪ Li = N \ {i} hence #(Hi ∪ Li) = N − 1.
Suppose we change contract S into contract S ′ as follows: (i) If more than one agent
shirks, the contract is not changed. (ii) If one or no agent shirks, the monetary payoffs
of all agents i ∈ B are increased, whereas the monetary payoffs of all agents j ∈ BC are
decreased. Let (N) and (N−1) be the increase in monetary payoffs for all agents i ∈ B
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if N and N − 1 agents work, respectively. With γ = #B/#BC the monetary payoffs for
all agents j ∈ BC are then reduced by γ(N) and γ(N − 1) to preserve budget-balance.
(iii) (N) and (N − 1) are chosen so that incentives to work for all agents i ∈ C remain
constant. (iv) (N) and (N − 1) are strictly positive but sufficiently small so that the
rank order of agents is preserved in the following sense: If given contract S agent j ∈ BC
is strictly better off than agent i ∈ B if all agents work, if only agent i shirks, or if only
agent j shirks, then given contract S ′ she is not strictly worse off in the corresponding
situation.
The above changes make contract S ′ more equal at N than contract S while pre-
serving budget-balance. We next show that agents’ incentives are not harmed. By
construction, the above changes only affect inequity between agents i ∈ B and j ∈ BC .
The change in incentives for all agents i ∈ C is
(A7) (N)
(
1 + (1 + γ)
α#BC
N − 1
)
− (N − 1)
(
1 + (1 + γ)
(
α#(Hi ∩ BC)
N − 1 −
β#(Li ∩ BC)
N − 1
))
= 0.
It is zero by choice of (N − 1) and (N). The change in incentives for all agents
i ∈ B \ C is also given by the l.h.s. of (A7). Compared to any agent j ∈ C we have
si(N − 1) ≥ sj(N − 1) by definition of C and therefore #(Hi ∩BC) ≤ #(Hj ∩BC) while
#(Li ∩ BC) ≥ #(Lj ∩ BC). The change in incentives for all agents i ∈ B \ C is thus
weakly larger as for any agent j ∈ C. These agents’ incentives are thus weakly improved.
Finally, the change in incentives for all agents i ∈ BC is given by
(A8) − (N)
(
γ − (1 + γ) β#B
N − 1
)
+ (N − 1)
(
γ + (1 + γ)
(
α#(Hi ∩ B)
N − 1 −
β#(Li ∩ B)
N − 1
))
.
Here γ = #B/#BC and β < (N − 1)/N imply that (N − 1) is multiplied by a strictly
positive factor. We show below that (N − 1) ≥ (N). Given this agents’ incentives are
not harmed as #(Hi ∩ B) ≥ 0 and #B ≥ #(Li ∩ B) ≥ 0.
We finally show that (A7) yields (N − 1) ≥ (N). First, (N − 1) is multiplied with
a strictly positive factor in (A7) because γ = #B/#BC and β < (N − 1)/N . Second,
all agents i ∈ B have the lowest possible rank when all agents, including themselves, are
working. These agents can only improve in their rank by shirking. As some agents j ∈ BC
may be in Li (and thus not in Hi), we have #(Hi ∩ BC) ≤ #BC and #(Li ∩ BC) ≥ 0.
This implies (N − 1) ≥ (N) as the latter is multiplied with a larger factor than the
former. Repeated application of the above contract changes results in a contract that is
equal at N while preserving budget-balance and without harming incentives.
A.2.2 Making a Contract also Equal at N-1 Strictly Improves Incentives
Consider a budget-balancing contract S that is equal at N , but unequal at N − 1. We
first show that if si(N − 1) > sj(N − 1) then agent i has weaker incentives than agent
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j. Take two agents i, j ∈ N with si(N − 1) > sj(N − 1). Suppose we repeatedly change
contract S as follows: (i) If no or at least two agents shirk, the contract is not changed.
(ii) If one agent shirks, then sj(N − 1) is increased by (N − 1) and si(N − 1) is reduced
by the same amount. Budget-balance is thus preserved. (iii) All agents’ rank order is
preserved in the sense of part A.2.1 of this proof. Keeping agents i, j fixed we repeat the
above contract changes until we get to the contract S˜ in which agent i and j’ monetary
payoffs at N − 1 are interchanged: s˜i(N − 1) = sj(N − 1) and s˜j(N − 1) = si(N − 1).
Note that at some point agent j gets a higher monetary payoff than agent i in case one
agent shirks.
We now show that the above contract changes strictly decrease agent j’s incentives.
After every contract change there are two possible cases. First, suppose sj(N − 1) ≥
si(N − 1)− c so that in case only agent j shirks she only suffers from compassion with
respect to agent i. Given contract S define the sets Hj and Lj as before. Then the
above contract changes decrease the incentives of agent j by
(A9) (N − 1)
(
1− β(#(Lj \ {i}) + 2)
N − 1 +
α#Hj
N − 1
)
> 0
where β < (N − 1)/N and #(Lj \ {i}) ≤ N − 2 imply the inequality. Note that
inequity between agent i and j is reduced by 2(n−1) whereas inequity between agent j
and all other agents in Lj or Hj is increased or decreased by (n− 1). Second, suppose
sj(N−1) < si(N−1)−c. Then the above contract changes decreases agent j’s incentive
to work even more as it then reduces inequity between agent i and j that is unfavorable
for agent j. But given contract S˜, agent j then has the same incentives to work as agent
i given the old contract S and vice versa. As the above contract changes consistently
decrease agent j incentives, then given the old contract S agent i must have weaker
incentives to work than agent j.
We can now show that making contract S equal at N − 1 strictly increases agents’
minimum incentives to exert effort. β < (N − 1)/N implies that an agent’s utility is
strictly increasing in her own monetary payoff. Making a contract equal at N − 1 thus
decreases incentives for those agents who have small monetary payoffs at N − 1 and
thus strong incentives to work, but increases incentives for those agents who have high
monetary payoffs at N − 1 and thus weak incentives to work. Therefore, making a
budget-balancing contract that is equal at N also equal at N − 1 equalizes incentives
to work across all agents and therefore strictly increases agents’ minimum incentives to
work. This holds no matter whether agents are inequity averse or selfish.
A.2.3 Strictly Improving Agents’ Minimum Incentives
Part A.2.1 and A.2.2 of this proof show that it is always possible to change any initial
budget-balancing contract into a budget-balancing contract that is equal at the top
without harming incentives. But as the size of the contract changes in part A.2.1 and
A.2.2 are not uniquely pinned down, there are different ways of conducting this change.
In the following we distinguish two cases. In the first case the initial contract S is already
equal at N but unequal at N − 1, or it can be changed into a contract S ′ that is equal
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at N but not equal at N − 1. Then part A.2.2 directly implies that agents’ minimum
incentives to exert effort are strictly improved. This result holds no matter whether
agents are inequity averse or selfish. In the second case all contract changes resulting in
equality at N simultaneously result in equality at N−1. In the following we concentrate
on this case and show that agents’ minimum incentives to exert effort are then always
improved if and only if agents are inequity averse.
Suppose we are in the second case and agents are inequity averse. Contract changes
can be chosen arbitrarily small and always simultaneously result in equality at N and
at N − 1. Then there exists an intermediate contract S˜ where the monetary payoffs
s˜i(N − 1) and s˜j(N − 1) are arbitrarily close for all i, j ∈ N . Given this contract S˜
consider contract changes as in part A.2.1 of the proof. As monetary payoffs at N − 1
are arbitrarily close, we have s˜i(N − 1) > s˜j(N − 1)− c for all i ∈ C and j ∈ BC . Then
#(Hi ∩ BC) < #BC . But if agents are inequity averse, α > 0, then #(Hi ∩ BC) < BC
and (A7) imply (N − 1) > (N). Therefore, the change in incentives for all agents
in BC as characterized in (A8) is strictly positive. Further contract changes results in
equality at the top. All agents then have equal incentives to exert effort. In this process
the incentives for some agents have been strictly improved. This implies that agents’
minimum incentives to exert effort have been strictly improved. Together with our result
from first case, making a contract equal at the top thus always strictly improves agents’
minimum incentives if agents are inequity averse.
Suppose we are in the second case and agents are selfish. Consider contract changes
as in part A.2.1 of the proof. As agents are selfish, α = β = 0, equation (A7) yields
(N) = (N − 1). Inspection of (A7) and (A8) shows that selfish agents’ incentives are
not improved. Q.E.D.
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